Sonja Solomun

Abolish the #TechToPrisonPipeline: Crime prediction technology reproduces injustices and causes real harm

Published by Medium

June 23, 2020

This open letter signed by more than 2,000 experts urges Springer Publishing to take down claims that a new crime prediction technology can predict criminal behaviour with no racial bias.

URL: https://medium.com/@CoalitionForCriticalTechnology/abolish-the-techtoprisonpipeline-9b5b14366b16

Reorienting Platform Power: Building a platform governance research network

by Sonja Solomun

Published by Data & Society: Points

February 16, 2021

In the month since the U.S. Capitol insurrection, the event has quickly become a benchmark for public and policy debates about the role of platforms in shaping democracy. While exposing both the important gatekeeping role that technology companies play in today’s media system and the lack of government redress to-date, recent media attention on deplatforming has tended to reify platform power through a largely North American lens. This framing often obscures the global inequities behind content moderation decisions, and the far more challenging structural problems underpinning them.

How do we contend with the democratic harms currently associated with platforms and their market concentration without fetishizing their power in the process?

URL: https://points.datasociety.net/reorienting-platform-power-831f960c797c

The Differences Between Contact Tracing and Exposure Notification

Published by Centre for Media, Technology and Democracy

June 4, 2020

The purpose of this policy memo is to provide an overview of the differences between contact tracing and exposure notification, and outline the current options for these technologies. We summarize the technical differences between the two approaches, and review the security and privacy risks, adoptability, and feasibility of three technologies:

- GPS-Based Contact Tracing
- Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) Based Contact Tracing
- BLE-Based Exposure Notification (Apple/Google model)

Should the federal government implement or endorse a contact tracing or exposure notification technology, this briefing recommends Bluetooth-based exposure notification. Federal decision-making will require a careful balance between public health and safety, technological capacity, and privacy protection. COVID-19 apps require the collection of vast amounts of data; this can compromise personal privacy and increase security risks, as individuals may be more easily identified or have their personal information (particularly sensitive health information) exposed. Location data of any kind is highly sensitive and can never be fully anonymized; even de-identified location data can be used to re-identify individuals, often from only a few data points.
In addition to securing privacy, strong data protection is an integral mechanism for ensuring public trust and adoptability. The capacity of any pandemic response technology should be rigorously weighed against its democratic impact and possible unforeseen (mis)uses

URL: https://www.mediatechdemocracy.com/work/differences-between-contact-tracing-exposure-notification

Evaluation Questions to Assess a Digital Contact Tracing / Exposure Notification Application

Published by Centre for Media, Technology and Democracy

This policy memo provides a framework for evaluating proposals for contact tracing apps and bluetooth exposure. The memo looks at privacy and security, and adoptability and implementation. The proposed questions serve as a framework for assessing the effectiveness, feasibility, and potential limitations and harms of a given application

URL: https://www.mediatechdemocracy.com/work/evaluation-questions-to-assess-contact-tracing-notification-application

Facial Recognition Moratorium Briefing #2: Conditions for Lifting a Moratorium on Public Use of Facial Recognition Technology in Canada

Published by Centre for Media, Technology and Democracy

August 18, 2020

This policy memo explores conditions under which a federal moratorium on Facial Recognition Technology could be lifted in Canada.

URL: https://www.mediatechdemocracy.com/work/facial-recognition-moratorium-briefing-1-wfgs7

Facial Recognition Moratorium Briefing #1: Implications of a Moratorium on the Use of Facial Recognition Technology in Canada

Published by Centre for Media, Technology and Democracy

August 18, 2020

This policy memo describes the implications for a temporary prohibition or moratorium on the Canadian public sector’s use of Facial Recognition Technology

URL: https://www.mediatechdemocracy.com/work/facial-recognition-moratorium-briefing-1

Facial Recognition Roundtable: What We Heard

Published by Cybersecure Policy Exchange

February 17, 2021

In November 2020, the Cybersecure Policy Exchange at Ryerson University and the Tech Informed Policy initiative at McGill University’s Centre for Media, Technology and Democracy co-organized a roundtable on the governance of facial recognition technology (FRT). The event brought together 30 expert stakeholders and government officials under Chatham House Rules, to examine the implications of a temporary prohibition on the public sector’s use of FRT in Canada.

This report summarizes what we heard at the event, organized by: how facial recognition software is being used by the public sector, including its potential benefits and risks; views on the push for a limited prohibition on its use; and options to mitigate risk before and during the use of FRT for consideration, as proposed by the event’s participants.

URL: https://www.cybersecurepolicy.ca/frt-what-we-heard

February 17, 2021

Canada’s federal institutions are collecting, using, and disclosing people’s facial information. They are also increasingly relying on technology that uses this information, in combination with automated decision-making processes, to uniquely identify individuals. This is happening in Canada today, without adequate direction and protection from the Privacy Act. The use of this technology raises significant privacy and security concerns for people in Canada, including the potential to enable mass surveillance and discrimination enabled by systems trained on datasets already imbued with prejudice and bias.

By implementing the following recommendations to amend the Privacy Act, the Government of Canada can mitigate serious privacy and security risks currently faced by people in Canada with respect to facial recognition technology:

1. explicitly acknowledge biometric & facial info
2. limit collection & use requiring notice +consent / legislative permission
3. align w/ Canada's Directive on Automated Decision Making
4. Implement a federal moratorium until responsible governance is reached

URL: https://www.cybersecurepolicy.ca/frt-privacy-act

Platform Responsibility and Regulation in Canada: Considerations on Transparency, Legislative Clarity, and Design

by Sonja Solomun, Maryna Polataiko, Helen A. Hayes

Published by Harvard Journal of Law and Technology Digest

February 8, 2021

Ahead of Canada’s upcoming legislation on online hate, this article outlines legislative considerations on transparency, clarity, and design.

The article highlights the importance of transparency reporting and detailed legislation that clearly defines categories of speech and establishes notice and counter-notice requirements. The article highlights the necessity of protecting online users from unlawful speech and oppressive take-downs, while likewise recognizing the importance of regulation that protects the democratic potential of online spaces.

URL: https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/platform-responsibility-and-regulation-in-canada-considerations-on-transparency-legislative-clarity-and-design